A Google search on University of Pennsylvania law professor Stephen J. Morse pulled up several articles on neurolaw. Because I found quotes of Morse in a recent article to be provocative, I was motivated to do the search to see what else the professor has said.
I certainly do not agree with all of his beliefs. For example, Morse is quoted in "UPenn professor gives lecture on moral, civil responsibility":
I am a physicalist as well as a monist . . . . There is and always only will be matter and nothing further, there is no soul, no top down intelligence, now human brains can produce nonmaterial things like culture, but it begins with matter. The mind cannot separate itself from the body.
As regular readers of my blogs know, I do think the mind is separate from the brain and from the rest of the body. And as my friends know, yep, I believe in soul!
I do agree with Morse's caution regarding what neuroscience can tell us about individual responsibility.
. . . Morse proceeded to dispel the two arguments that "new neuroscience" seemed to suggest might change the idea of moral responsibility.
Morse argued that "current neuroscientific discoveries do not undermine the traditional view of the person as a creature capable of acting for reasons that explain the person's behavior."
Morse simply concluded that "neuroscience does not yet undermine traditional concepts of responsibility."
At Morse's Web pages, you will find a number of other articles, and some interviews. Those of you with an interest in neurolaw will be happy to see the resources. From the media:
Law and Psychiatry Professor Stephen Morse
- Says that cases involving neuroscience are still relatively rare - and for good reason. Things like foolproof lie detectors based on brain scans are still "more popular imagination than reality” although some companies have begun marketing such devices. (3/2/2008). Forbes .
- Explores the implications for law of the new neuroscience. (1/14/2008). “Justice Talking,” National Public Radio.
- Appears on the Charlie Rose Show to discuss Neurolaw. (6/11/2007). Audio.
- Says, “Virtually always, when people claim they committed a crime in an automatic state, that automatic state was relatively transient,” refuting the "neurolaw" defense presented in the Peter Braunstein case. (4/30/2007). The New York Times .
- Insists, "Brains do not commit crimes: people commit crimes." Sunday Magazine, The New York Times. (3/11/2007). Article. [I have written about this article on neurolaw.]
- Discusses whether new advances in neuroscience and brain imaging should change our idea of criminal responsibility. Minnesota Public Radio (2/1/2007). Audio.
- Discusses whether the lack of empathy in psychopaths could affect their legal responsibility. Wired. (9/27/2006). Article.
- And his co-author argue in a New York Times op-ed that "the criteria for responsibility -- intentionality and moral capacity -- are social and legal concepts, not scientific, medical or psychiatric ones." (7/30/2006). Article.
Journal articles include one defining a cognitive pathology to which I am sure I will be referring in future conversations and presentations: Brain Overclaim Syndrome! From the article:
[I]nfected and inflamed by stunning advances in our understanding of the brain, advocates all too often make moral and legal claims that the new neuroscience does not entail and cannot sustain. Particular brain findings are thought to lead inevitably to moral or legal conclusions. Brains are blamed for offenses; agency and responsibility disappear from the legal landscape. For example, in Roper v. Simmons, advocates for abolition of the death penalty for adolescents who committed murder when they were sixteen or seventeen years old argued that the demonstrated lack of complete myelination of the cortical neurons of the adolescent brain was reason to believe that sixteen and seventeen year old murderers were insufficiently responsible to deserve capital punishment. These types of responses, I claim, are the signs of a disorder that I have preliminarily entitled Brain Overclaim Syndrome [BOS].
The cure for BOS? Cognitive-Jurotherapy (CJ).
The signs and symptoms of BOS are all cognitive. I therefore propose that CJ is likely to be the best treatment. The therapeutic techniques, all of which require motivation, effort and practice, follow directly from the signs and symptoms of BOS.
The "royal road to complete recovery" has four components. Morse summarizes:
All of the above is really just a “high falutin,” partially tongue-in-cheek way of suggesting that people need to think more clearly and make more transparent, logical arguments about the relationship of anything to criminal responsibility. The question is why more PCs [Potential Commentators] do not do this. I do not know the answer, but I suspect that two primary culprits are at work: intellectual naiveté and ideological blinders.
Nice summary of some reasons why people are making more of brain science than is warranted. As I have said before and will say again, much caution is needed as we see the legal profession looking to neuroscience for any answers about the brain's learning, thinking, decoding, and deciding.
Note: I posted a few words about BOS in conflict resolution, the workplace, and sales.
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