Michael Pardo and Dennis Patterson have responded to comments on an earlier article they wrote titled "Minds, Brains, and Norms" (download from SSRN). Their newest discussion of neuroscience and law is "More on the Conceptual and the Empirical: Misunderstandings, Clarifications, and Replies" (download from SSRN). Abstract of the new article:
At the invitation of the Editors of Neuroethics, we wrote an article (entitled, “Minds, Brains, and Norms”) detailing our views on a variety of claims by those arguing for the explanatory power of neuroscience in matters of law and ethics. The Editors invited comments on our article from four distinguished academics (Walter Glannon, Carl Craver, Sarah Robins, and Thomas Nadelhoffer) and invited our reply to their critique of our views. In this reply to our commentators, we correct some potential misunderstandings of our views and further clarify our positions with discussions of the conceptual-empirical distinction, rule-following, explanations at the personal and subpersonal levels, memory, and lie detection. Although we acknowledge many of the criticisms advanced by our distinguished colleagues, we conclude that, in several important respects, their criticisms confirm the points made in our original article.
My prior posts on Pardo and Patterson:
- Some hard questions about neurolaw: If you are interested in law and neuroscience, read this article
- Another article looking at neurolaw with a critical eye
- A critical eye on neurolaw: Two of the leading critics of neurolaw have signed up for a reading group at The Law and Neuroscience Blog
H/T: Legal Theory Blog.
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